Legislature(2023 - 2024)GRUENBERG 120
05/10/2023 01:00 PM House JUDICIARY
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| Audio | Topic |
|---|---|
| Start | |
| SB53 | |
| HB4 | |
| Adjourn |
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
| + | HB 4 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| + | SB 53 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| + | TELECONFERENCED |
SB 53-COMPETENCY; INVOLUNTARY CIVIL COMMITMENTS
3:21:56 PM
CHAIR VANCE announced that the first order of business would be
CS FOR SENATE BILL NO. 53(FIN) am, "An Act relating to
competency to stand trial; relating to involuntary civil
commitments; and relating to victims' rights during certain
civil commitment proceedings."
3:22:22 PM
SENATOR MATT CLAMAN, Alaska State Legislature, presented CSSB
53(FIN) AM, as the prime sponsor. He paraphrased the sponsor
statement [included in the committee packet], which read as
follows [original punctuation provided]:
Senate Bill 53 expands involuntary commitment law in
Title 47 by adding the option of an up to two-year
involuntary commitment for a limited number of
individuals who: (1) have been found incompetent to
stand trial on a felony offense against the person or
felony arson, (2) have been previously subject to
involuntary commitment orders, (3) have a history of a
felony offense against the person or arson, (4)
present a danger to themselves or others, and (5)
present a danger to the public.
In February 2022, Angela Harris was returning books at
the Loussac Library in Anchorage when a man stabbed
her in the back. The perpetrator had been found
incompetent to stand trial two months earlier for
attacks on other women. SB 53 addresses the problem
presented by Angela's experience. First, it creates a
duty for the Department of Law to file for involuntary
commitment when a person is found incompetent to stand
trial on what are identified as "dangerous" crimes in
the legislation. This process will ensure that
individuals who have committed crimes for which they
cannot be tried will be moved from the criminal
system, upon dismissal of changes due to incompetency,
to the civil system for involuntary commitment. The
process improves public safety by filling gaps that
previously allowed the individual to be released to
the public.
Second, it amends involuntary commitment statute to
allow the state to seek two-year involuntary
commitment of individuals who have been found
incompetent to stand trial, have a history of a felony
offense against the person or arson, and have already
been subject to 30, 90 and 180-day involuntary holds.
Individuals committed under these provisions may
petition the court for early discharge. A petition for
early discharge requires that the respondent presents
some evidence demonstrating that they are no longer a
danger to themselves or others.
The legislation adds provisions for notification of
the victim in the dismissed criminal case of: the time
and place of the civil commitment hearing; the length
of time for which the respondent is committed; and
when the respondent is discharged from commitment. It
allows the victim in the dismissed criminal case to
attend the civil commitment hearings.
SB 53 also reduces the number of psychiatrists and
psychologists required for evaluation under the
insanity defense from two to one; adds a requirement
that the court must make findings of fact and
conclusions of law when it orders a competency exam;
and provides that the court can release defendants on
bail for competency examination, evaluation, and
treatment.
Language was added to the legislation in response to
the Alaska Supreme Court decision In re Abigail B
(April 28, 2023). This language does not relieve the
state of its duty to comply with all terms of
Disability Law Center v. State (2020).
3:25:28 PM
EMMA POTTER, Staff, Senator Matt Claman, Alaska State
Legislature, on behalf of Senator Claman, prime sponsor, gave
the sectional analysis for CSSB 53(FIN) AM, which read as
follows [original punctuation provided]:
Section 1
AS 12.47.070. Psychiatric examination
Amends subsection (a) to reduce the number of
qualified psychiatrists or psychologists from two to
one for evaluation under the affirmative defense of
insanity. Removes the requirement that the
psychologist is certified by the American Board of
Forensic Psychology.
Section 2
AS 12.47.100. Incompetency to proceed
Amends subsection (b) by adding the requirement that
the court make findings of fact and conclusions of law
that justify an examination when ordering the
defendant examined for competency.
Section 3
AS 12.47.100. Incompetency to proceed
Adds a new subsection (i), which states that the court
may order a defendant on bail to be examined at an
outpatient clinic or other facility under AS 12.30.
This section includes requirements that the court
shall consider, in addition to applicable requirements
under AS 12.30, for the conditions of a defendant's
release under this section: (1) any medical
information provided by the Department of Family and
Community Services; (2) the defendant's mental
condition; (3) the defendant's level of need for
evaluation and treatment under this chapter; (4) the
defendant's ability to participate in outpatient
treatment; and (5) the defendant's history of
evaluation and treatment under this chapter.
Adds a new subsection (j) which states that when a
qualified psychiatrist or psychologist is conducting
an examination for competency under (b) of this
section, they may, at the same time, evaluate the
defendant to determine whether the defendant meets the
standards for involuntary commitment.
Adds a new subsection (k) which states that a court
may rely on a defense attorney's representation,
including privileged information provided at an ex
parte hearing, in making its findings of fact and
conclusions of law when having the defendant examined
for competency.
Section 4
AS 12.47.110. Commitment on finding of incompetency
Adds a new subsection (f), which states that the court
may order a defendant on bail to receive further
evaluation and treatment at an outpatient clinic or
other facility under AS 12.30. This section includes
requirements that the court shall consider, in
addition to applicable requirements under AS 12.30,
for the conditions of a defendant's release under this
section: (1) any medical information provided by the
Department of Family and Community Services; (2) the
defendant's mental condition; (3) the defendant's
level of need for evaluation and treatment under this
chapter; (4) the defendant's ability to participate in
outpatient treatment; and (5) the defendant's history
of evaluation and treatment under this chapter.
Adds a new subsection (g), which states that, upon the
court finding that the defendant charged with a felony
offense against a person or felony arson remains
incompetent at the expiration of the period for
competency restoration, the prosecutor shall: (1) file
a petition seeking involuntary commitment under the
new AS 47.30.706 before dismissal of charges; (2)
notify the civil division of the Department of Law
within 24 hours after filing the petition; and (3)
provide the court's findings to the civil division of
the Department of Law within 24 hours after the
court's ruling.
Section 5
AS 47.30.705. Emergency detention for evaluation
Adds new subsection (e), which states that the
department shall promptly deliver a person who is
detained awaiting transport for evaluation for
commitment to a crisis residential center or
evaluation facility. The person may not be detained
for more than 10 days while awaiting transportation
unless a court extends under (f) of this section.
Subsection (f) states that the department or facility
detaining a person under (a) or (e) of this section
may file a request to extend the detention based on
the on the person meeting the standards for commitment
and continued need for hold. The request must include
a verified or certified statement of a mental health
professional and be served on related parties
including the respondent. When the court decides to
request to extend the detention pending
transportation, the court shall consider the following
factors: (1) the length of time the person has been
detained; (2) the reason the person has not yet been
transported; (3) the person's current medical and
psychiatric condition; (4) whether the person is
gravely disabled or is likely to cause serious harm to
self or others; and (5) whether the person is
receiving treatment at their current placement.
Subsection (g) states that the court shall schedule
hearings if requested by the respondent under (f) of
this section, which shall be held no later than 72
hours after the expiration of the 10-day detention
period.
Subsection (h) states that at any time during the
detention period, the mental health professional at
the detaining facility may release the respondent
based on their finding that the person does not meet
the standards for commitment. The facility shall
notify related parties if the respondent is released.
3:29:00 PM
REPRESENTATIVE ALLARD interjected to highlight a deviation
between the language in the sectional analysis and Ms. Potter's
reading of it. She sought to clarify whether a detaining
facility "may" release the respondent or "shall" release the
respondent, per Section 5, subsection (h).
3:29:48 PM
MS. POTTER directed attention to subsection (h) on page 5, line
7 of the bill, which stated that the respondent "shall" be
released.
REPRESENTATIVE ALLARD noted that the sectional analysis said
"may."
MS. POTTER acknowledged the error in the sectional.
3:31:10 PM
MS. POTTER resumed the sectional analysis [included in the
committee packet], which read as follows [original punctuation
provided]:
Section 6
AS 47.30.706. Commitment after finding of incompetence
Creates a new section AS 47.30.706: Commitment after
finding of incompetence. Subsection (a) states that if
a person who has been charged with a felony offense
against a person or felony arson has been found
incompetent to proceed with criminal charges, and
before the charges are dismissed, an attorney with the
Department of Law shall petition the court to have the
person delivered to the nearest evaluation facility
for an evaluation.
Subsection (b) states that upon receiving the petition
under (a) of this section, the court shall: unless the
presumption is successfully rebutted, issue an ex
parte order stating that there is probable cause to
believe the respondent is mentally ill and that
condition causes the respondent to present a
likelihood of serious harm or self to others; appoint
an attorney to represent the respondent; and may
direct that a peace officer take the respondent into
custody and deliver the respondent to the nearest
appropriate facility for evaluation. The court shall
set a date, time, and place for a 30-day commitment
hearing, to be held within 72 hours.
Subsection (c) states that a person taken into custody
for evaluation under this section may not be placed in
a jail or other correctional facility except for
protective custody purposes and only while awaiting
transportation to an evaluation facility.
Subsection (d) states that an individual charged with
a felony offense against a person or felony arson who
is found to be incompetent to stand trial is
rebuttably presumed to be mentally ill and present a
likelihood of serious harm to self or others. This
creates the basis upon which the court can issue the
ex parte order and initiate the 30-day commitment
proceedings. This section states that in its
evaluation whether a defendant is likely to cause
serious harm, the court may consider the conduct with
which the defendant was charged.
Section 7
AS 47.30.710. Examination; hospitalization
Adds reference to the new section AS 47.30.706:
Commitment after finding of incompetence to subsection
(a) of AS 47.30.710. Section 8 AS 47.30.725. Rights;
notification Adds new subsections (g) and (h), which
create notification provisions for the victim of the
dismissed criminal case. Subsection (g) states that
the victim shall be notified of: the time and place of
a civil commitment hearing; the length of time for
which the respondent is committed and findings of fact
made by the court; and when the respondent is
discharged from commitment. Additionally, (g) states
that a victim in a dismissed criminal case may attend
the civil commitment hearing of the respondent.
Subsection (h) states that this section does not give
a victim in a dismissed criminal case the right to
access confidential records under AS 47.30.845.
Section 9
AS 47.30.727. Provision of records and notice
following a finding of incompetency in a criminal case
Creates a new section addressing the release of
records to the criminal division of the Department of
Law by the civil division during the involuntary
commitment of an individual who was found incompetent
to stand trial. Subsection (a) states that every 30
days after a respondent is found incompetent to
proceed and committed involuntarily, the civil
division of the Department of Law shall provide all
information and records obtained during the civil
commitment to the criminal division of the Department
of Law.
Subsection (b) states that records disclosed to the
criminal division are confidential and may not be
disclosed to anyone unless disclosure is required by a
court order or the respondent provides written consent
to the disclosure. The records are to be filed as
sealed documents by the moving party if they are used
in a criminal proceeding.
Subsection (c) states that the facility housing a
respondent found incompetent to proceed and
involuntarily committed shall provide notice to the
prosecutor in the criminal case of all hearings
scheduled by the court in the civil commitment case.
This subsection states that the prosecutor or their
staff member may attend civil commitment hearings but
may not participate as a party.
Section 10
AS 47.30.735. 30-day commitment; hearing
Amends subsection (b) to allow victims in dismissed
cases where the respondent was charged with a felony
offense against a person or felony arson to attend
civil commitment proceedings of the respondent.
Section 11
AS 47.30.771. Additional two-year commitment
Adds a new section creating an additional involuntary
commitment of up to two years. Two-year commitment
petitions are filed at the expiration of 180-day
commitments for individuals who meet the following
criteria: the respondent is mentally ill and as a
result is likely to cause harm to self or others; the
respondent has a history of a felony offense against a
person under AS 11.41 or felony arson; the respondent
has been found incompetent to stand trial under AS
12.47.100 and 12.47.110 for a felony offense against a
person under AS 11.41 or arson; commitment of the
respondent for greater than 180 days but not greater
than two years is necessary to protect the public; and
the period of commitment is necessary to protect the
public.
Clarifies that findings of fact relating to the
respondent's behavior made at 30-day, 90-day, and 180-
day commitment hearings shall be admitted as evidence
in subsequent hearings. States that successive
commitments are permissible on the same ground and
under the same procedures as the original commitment.
Instructs the department to submit an annual report to
the attorney general, public defender, public
advocate, Alaska Court System, and the attorney of
record of the respondent detailing how many
respondents are committed under this section and how
much time remains on each order of commitment.
Section 12
AS 47.30.780. Early discharge
Amends subsection (a) to include reference to new
subsection (c) of AS 47.30.780.
Section 13
AS 47.30.780. Early discharge
Adds new subsections (c), (d) and (e). Subsection (c)
states that the professional person in charge may not
discharge respondents, who meet the standard of
dangerousness set forth in the legislation, from 180-
day or up to two year involuntary commitment orders
unless: the court enters an order officially
terminating the involuntary commitment and the court
gives the prosecuting authority 10 days' notice of the
discharge. Subsections (d) and (e) state that a
respondent who is committed under an up to two-year
commitment order may petition the court for early
discharge at any time, with a 180-day limit on
frequency, during the commitment if they present some
evidence demonstrating that the respondent is no
longer likely to cause serious harm to self or others.
The court is required to grant early discharge unless
the state proves by clear and convincing evidence that
there is a factual and medical basis to believe the
respondent remains likely to cause serious harm to
self or others.
Section 14
AS 47.30.805. Computation, extension, and expiration
of periods of time
Amends section (a) to include two-year commitments.
States that a two-year commitment period expires at
the end of two years after the 180-day period of
treatment.
Section 15
AS 47.30.845. Confidential records
Amends section (a) to include the criminal division of
the Department of Law under section 8 of this
legislation.
3:37:49 PM
CHAIR VANCE opened invited testimony.
3:38:05 PM
ANGELA HARRIS, representing self, testified in support of SB
53. She explained that she was stabbed while returning borrowed
items at the Loussac Library on February 13, 2022. She provided
details of her experience, which ultimately left her paralyzed
from the waist down. She noted that she was unable to live in
her home until modifications were made to make it handicap
accessible and safe for her to navigate. Further, her
significant other had to quit his job on the North Slope to
become her primary caretaker. She outlined her long road to
recovery, which included physical and occupational therapy, and
counseling. She shared that her assailant, Corey Ahkivgak, had
a history of assaulting women, including his mother who he
attacked with a frying pan. After violently attacking two more
women, he was declared incompetent and released back into the
public just 38 days before attacking Ms. Harris. Again, after
her stabbing on February 13, he was declared incompetent and may
be released back into the public after a competency hearing.
She emphasized the need for improvements to the state's mental
health system, particularly regarding violent offenders.
Further, she asserted that the loophole allowing people to be
released back into the community after committing a violent
crime needed to be closed. SB 53 would close the loophole and
target a narrow group of violent individuals, she said. She
believed that jail was an inappropriate placement for Mr.
Ahkivgak given his mental illness. She addressed the concerns
about protecting civil liberties, noting that she shared those
concerns. She indicated that many state agencies had been
involved with the proposed legislation and made important
changes to strengthen the bill. She discussed the difficulties
of knowing that her assailant may be released back into the
community. She said she was appalled upon learning that many
individuals release from custody due to the waitlist for
restoration, thereby violating the civil liberties of the
offender. She opined that there should be a long-term placement
option for repeat violent offenders who cannot retain
competency, adding that it was unfair to both offenders and
victims to allow them to continuously cycle through the system
with no improvements to their mental health. Perpetrators, such
as Mr. Ahkivgak, she said, had more resources at his disposal
than she, as his victim. She was ultimately offered just $3,000
for mental health services from the Victims Crime Compensation
Board nearly one year after her initial request, which she
characterized as insulting. Victoria Shanklin, former executive
director of Victims For Justice, shared that an outdated system
and limited budget had caused the organization to fall
embarrassingly behind. Ms. Harris stated that her assault
exemplified the need to address the common element of inadequate
mental health services for violent offenders and their victims;
further, that her experience exposed a loophole in statute with
a deadly impact on Alaska communities. She said the bill was an
opportunity for elected officials to make changes that were
beneficial for all Alaskans.
3:47:00 PM
CHAIR VANCE thanked Ms. Harris for her advocacy for victims.
3:47:13 PM
REPRESENTATIVE ALLARD expressed concern that an individual could
be "sucker punched" and claim mental illness. She asked how the
bill could "encompass all." She acknowledged the importance of
the proposed legislation, while emphasizing the need to make it
airtight.
SENATOR CLAMAN replied that the legislation sought to strike the
best balance possible between requiring individuals with an
appropriate level of violent criminal history to be put into the
process of an involuntary commitment. He acknowledged the
challenge of protecting the community from individuals who may
be suffering from significant mental illnesses and engaging in
criminal conduct. He added that the constitutional protections
for incompetency would remain.
REPRESENTATIVE ALLARD said she wanted to include mentally ill
individuals who physically "lash out" in the bill to ensure that
their behavior would not continue.
SENATOR CLAMAN shared his belief that the bill would close the
gap for those individuals with a history of felony conduct.
REPRESENTATIVE ALLARD recalled that Ms. Harris had mentioned
Victoria Shanklin in her testimony. She asked which department
[Victims For Justice] fell under.
MS. HARRIS replied that after working for [Victims For Justice],
Ms. Harris took a job with the state doing the same type of
work. She shared her understanding that Victims For Justice was
a nonprofit.
REPRESENTATIVE ALLARD asked whether the $3,000 that was awarded
to Ms. Harris was delayed by Victims For Justice.
MS. HARRIS clarified that she had filed her claim through a
state website.
3:51:30 PM
SENATOR CLAMAN shared his understanding that Victims For Justice
was a nonprofit, whereas the compensation was granted by the
Victims Compensation Fund, which was a state run fund.
REPRESENTATIVE ALLARD asked whether the Victims Compensation
Fund was run by the [Department of Health (DOH)].
MS. HARRIS explained that the systems used by Ms. Shanklin were
outdated. She shared an example. She agreed that the
processing system was inadequate; however, it was not addressed
in the proposed legislation. She added that she intended to
return next session to address that issue.
3:54:14 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRAY expressed his sympathy for Ms. Harris
despite feeling the need to ask a lot of questions about the
bill. Referencing Section 13, he sought to confirm that the
professional person in charge was forbidden [from issuing] an
early discharge.
SENATOR CLAMAN clarified that the professional person in charge
was required to provide 10 days' notice before releasing [the
respondent].
REPRESENTATIVE GRAY asked whether the provision was restating
existing statute.
SENTOR CLAMAN explained that it was taking the same standard in
existing statute and applying it to this situation.
REPRESENTATIVE GRAY sought to confirm that the provision was a
safeguard against ruling an individual as safe for release.
SENATOR CLAMAN shared his understanding that when discharging an
individual who had engaged in serious criminal conduct, the idea
was to give the prosecutor time to decide whether to refile
charges based on the belief that the person may be competent.
The 10-day period would allow the prosecutor's office to file
criminal charges and make a determination, he said.
REPRESENTATIVE GRAY asked Mr. Skidmore whether Senator Claman's
understanding was correct.
3:58:45 PM
JOHN SKIDMORE, Deputy Attorney General, Central Office, Criminal
Division, Department of Law (DOL), agreed with Senator Claman,
indicating that the 10-day period provided time for a petition
or charges to be filed for someone discharging civilly. He
added that the purpose behind the timeframe allowed prosecutors
time to determine various factors and make an informed decision
on refiling charges.
REPRESENTATIVE GRAY asked whether this type of detention was
occurring at present.
SENATOR CLAMAN recalled that there were 10 individuals who had
been involved in criminal conduct and were believed to be
dangerous. Those individuals were subject to involuntary
commitment and continuously repeating 180-day commitment cycles.
One such individual had been in custody for approximately nine
years, he noted. He confirmed that people were being held
involuntarily based on their psychiatric conditions and being
dangerous to themselves and others.
REPRESENTATIVE GRAY sought to confirm that Ms. Harris's
assailant was not held for 180 days.
SENATOR CLAMAN clarified that Mr. Ahkivgak was one of the 10
individuals subject to involuntary commitment and had not been
released since attacking Ms. Harris.
4:02:27 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRAY shared his understanding that Mr. Ahkivgak
had assaulted a person just months before assaulting Ms. Harris.
He asked why Mr. Ahkivgak had not been detained after the first
assault.
MS. HARRIS explained that her family was persistent in
communication with the district attorney (DA) and the attorney
general (AG), at which point the state informed them of the
civil commitment request. She credited her family's efforts for
Mr. Ahkivgak's continued stay in custody.
4:03:39 PM
CHAIR VANCE believed that Representative Gray was trying to
identify the loophole in statute, which was the nexus for the
bill. She asked Senator Claman to describe the bigger picture.
SENATOR CLAMAN cited Section 6 of the bill, which contained the
new statute AS 47.30.706. The new statute would fill the gap in
current law by requiring the prosecutors of felony assaults or
felony arson to file the petition that initiates the commitment
process before the charges were dismissed. Were the bill in
place when Mr. Ahkivgak committed the assault prior to attacking
Ms. Harris, civil law would have required that a civil
commitment petition be filed.
CHAIR VANCE inferred that in essence, the bill would put the
responsibility [of filing the petition] onto the state instead
of the victim.
SENATOR CLAMAN confirmed that the bill would put the
responsibility of filing the petition squarely on the
prosecutor.
4:07:24 PM
REPRESENTATIVE CARPENTER asked Mr. Skidmore why involuntary
commitment paperwork was not filed for all defendants found
incompetent to stand trial.
MR. SKIDMORE stated that not everyone found incompetent to stand
trial would meet criteria for civil commitment. He shared an
example. He reiterated that the bill would require prosecutors
in the criminal division to file a petition to have an
evaluation conducted of the defendant to determine whether the
criteria for civil commitment was met before the case was
dismissed.
4:09:59 PM
REPRESENTATIVE CARPENTER rephrased his question. He asked why
DOL would choose not to file involuntary commitment on all of
the cases in which the defendant was being tried for a violent
crime and found incompetent to stand trial.
MR. SKIDMORE suspected that in the instances that did occur, it
was likely that prosecutors had not been trained to file such
petitions. He reiterated that the bill would place the
responsibility on the department to ensure that prosecutors were
trained on the process and filing petitions.
REPRESENTATIVE CARPENTER asked whether the statute needed to be
changed in order for prosecutors to be trained on filing the
petitions when necessary.
MR. SKIDMORE replied that the law did not need to be changed in
order to conduct training; however, if filing the petitions was
to become the prosecutor's duty, the law needed to be changed
because currently, it was not a requirement.
REPRESENTATIVE CARPENTER said he was failing to understand why
the law needed to be changed in order to force the department to
do something it was already capable of doing.
MR. SKIDMORE explained that placing the responsibility on
members of DOL would make it an obligation. Without the new
statute, he said, anyone can file the petition, thereby making
it an additional duty that was not specifically assigned to
[prosecutors]. He further noted that the fiscal note would
provide the appropriate resources to ensure that [petitions were
filed].
REPRESENTATIVE CARPENTER questioned the purpose of the two-year
commitment.
4:14:42 PM
SENATOR CLAMAN replied that the purpose was to provide a greater
level of assurance to victims; allow the Alaska Psychiatric
Institute to provide a better, long-term treatment plan to
offenders; and assure the public that [the legislature] was
paying attention to the public safety factors of the most
dangerous individuals. He noted that the two-year commitment
was involuntary commitment, at which point the offender had been
found incompetent to stand trial and the criminal charges were
dismissed. He noted that at the conclusion of the civil
commitment, another [competency hearing] may be sought; however,
providers had indicated that a return to competency was
unlikely.
4:17:21 PM
REPRESENTATIVE CARPENTER asked why the original charges would be
dropped if there was a chance that the offender could be deemed
competent again. He asserted that the purpose of the commitment
should be to make the offender competent enough to stand trial.
SENATOR CLAMAN clarified that the civil commitment was not a
criminal process, adding that it was only arrived at after being
unable to restore the person to competence. He deferred to Mr.
Skidmore for a more detailed explanation.
MR. SKIDMORE confirmed that the two-year commitment was not for
purposes of restoring competency. The civil commitment process,
he said, was about the individual being a danger to themselves
or others and consequently, involuntarily committed to treat the
mental illness that makes them such. He added that it was
possible for the mental illness to be treated while still being
incompetent. The bill would allow the criminal division to
evaluate the competency of an individual whose mental illness
had been treated, such that they are no longer a danger to
themselves or others.
REPRESENTATIVE CARPENTER sought to confirm that if a person [who
had been involuntarily committed] was deemed competent, he/she
would not be charged for the original crime.
MR. SKIDMORE said if someone was restored to competency before
the criminal case was dismissed, the prosecution would continue.
Alternatively, if the civil commitment was determined to be no
longer necessary because the person was not a danger, the
criminal division would evaluate whether to prosecute based on a
host of factors.
4:21:14 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GROH sought to better understand the size of "the
universe" of relevant cases.
SENATOR CLAMAN responded that were this law in place when Ms.
Harris was assaulted, the state would have been required to file
an involuntary petition upon dismissal, thereby initiating [the
commitment process] rather than releasing Mr. Ahkivgak back into
the community due to his violent history. He directed the
question of statistics to Ms. Meade.
4:24:06 PM
NANCY MEADE, General Counsel, Office of the Administrative
Director, Alaska Court System, sought to clarify which data was
sought by Representative Groh.
REPRESENTATIVE GROH requested the number of people in continuous
cycles of involuntary commitment, in addition to the precise
number of people that had been found to be incompetent and
released from custody, similar to Mr. Ahkivgak.
MS. MEADE reported that 70 to 100 cases in FY 22 were dismissed
after undergoing a competency evaluation. Should the bill pass,
those individuals would be ushered into an evaluation for a
civil commitment after the criminal case was dismissed. She
noted that there were approximately 400 competency hearings [in
FY 22] of which 140 were felonies. She noted that very few of
those individuals were sent to API, due to a lack of beds. In
the meantime, individuals found incompetent to stand trial were
put on a four-month wait list for one of the 10 available beds.
Many of those cases were ultimately dismissed.
REPRESENTATIVE GROH inquired about the relationship between the
law and the services.
MS. MEADE clarified that API had 80 beds, of which 10 were used
in open criminal cases for individuals deemed incompetent,
termed "criminal restoration beds." She noted that many of
those criminal cases were dismissed due to either the four-month
wait or because the person could not be restored to competency.
Under the proposed legislation 100 of the dismissed cases would
be sent to the 70 beds at API, or a number of other facilities,
for an evaluation. She highlighted the different standard
between that of incompetency to stand trial and being mentally
committed.
4:29:17 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GROH asked how many cases were similar to Mr.
Ahkivgak's.
MS. MEADE replied that the court system did not have data on
that.
REPRESENTATIVE GROH asked how the proposed legislation would
address treatment of individuals who posed a risk to themselves.
SENATOR CLAMAN clarified that suicide was not a felony crime.
He explained that the proposed legislation distinguished between
those that were a risk to others versus a risk to themselves.
People that were a risk to others would be eligible for the two-
year involuntary commitment, whereas people that were a risk to
themselves would qualify for the six-month rotating involuntary
commitment.
4:33:29 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked to what extent the legislature
should be focusing on the law versus human actors in the justice
system who make mistakes.
MS. HARRIS asked Representative Eastman to narrow the question.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked Ms. Harris whether, in her case,
judges were at fault, prosecutors were at fault, or whether
fixing this law would have solved the problem.
MS. HARRIS stated that this piece of legislation regarding
prevention was the only thing she had the "band width" to dive
into. She shared that she had learned about a "large elephant"
of inadequacies within the system that need to be addressed to
alleviate the situation.
4:38:36 PM
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN asked whether the statute of limitations
were in any way "tolled" during the period in which a person was
incompetent to stand trial.
MR. SKIDMORE replied that there was nothing about a civil
commitment or attempts to restore somebody that tolls the
statute of limitations.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN shared his understanding that the bill
would dispense with the requirement for two psychologists
instead of one. He inquired about the motivation for this
change.
4:41:03 PM
SENATOR CLAMAN noted that Section 1 was a cleanup provision that
was largely unrelated to the bill, as it addressed an
affirmative defense for insanity. He said there were two
reasons for the change. Firstly, Alaska did not have a
psychologist that met the American Board of Forensic Psychology
standards. Secondly, when raising the defense of insanity, he
indicated that the second court-appointed expert [hired to
evaluate the defendant's psychiatric state] was unnecessary, as
the prosecutor and defense often hired their own experts. He
noted that the changes in Section 1 reflected a discussion
between his office and DOL.
REPRESENTATIVE EASTMAN considered a scenario in which a person
was likely to be found incompetent, in which case, the criminal
charges would be dropped. He suggested that the prosecutor may
want to preserve his/her win/loss record by only pursuing
confident convictions, adding that "there's less reason for them
to maybe be as careful."
SENATOR CLAMAN said he couldn't imagine a circumstance in which
a state or federal prosecutor in Alaska would try to handicap
his/her win/loss record based on a concern that somebody would
be found incompetent. He deferred to Mr. Skidmore.
4:47:58 PM
MR. SKIDMORE discussed the safeguards in place to protect
against the conduct described by Representative Eastman. He
clarified that prosecutors have ethical responsibilities to only
file charges in cases with appropriate evidence to support them.
Additionally, the courts have an obligation to review the
factual basis and determine whether there is probable cause to
support the charges. Lastly, he assured Representative Eastman
that DOL did not want its prosecutors to file charges unless
they could prevail beyond a reasonable doubt. Filing charges
without sufficient evidence could result in employment action on
behalf of the department, he added.
4:49:57 PM
REPRESENTATIVE ALLARD stated her belief that the minor statutory
changes in the proposed legislation would not have changed Ms.
Harris's circumstances. Further, she opined that the people who
enforce the law failed Ms. Harris, not the law itself. She
concluded that Ms. Harris persevered because of her parents, her
character, and the Coast Guard. She applauded Ms. Harris for
being here and characterized her case, which slid through the
cracks, as obscene. She questioned the difference between a
psychologist and a psychiatrist and expressed concern about
Section 1 of the bill.
4:51:40 PM
SENATOR CLAMAN indicated that the difference between a
psychologist and a psychiatrist was medical school and the
ability to prescribe medication.
REPRESENTATIVE ALLARD reiterated her concern about Section 1 of
the bill, which changed the requirement from two qualified
psychiatrists or psychologist to one.
SENATOR CLAMAN reiterated that the insanity defense had nothing
to do with the evaluation process for competency to stand trial.
The process for competency to stand trial only required an
evaluation by one psychologist or psychiatrist, which would not
be changed by the proposed legislation. With regard to the
affirmative defense for insanity, he emphasized that there were
always at least two opinions, noting that there were sometimes
up to four experts [hired by the defense or prosecution]. He
indicated that the opinion given by the court-appointed
psychiatrist or psychologist was typically followed up by one or
more experts hired by the defense or prosecution team. He
approximated that the defense of insanity had been raised at
trial less than 5 times in the last 30 years.
4:55:04 PM
REPRESENTATIVE ALLARD questioned the meaning of the language on
page 12, lines 4-5 of the bill.
SENATOR CLAMAN stated that paragraph (10) in Section 15 of the
bill provided that DOL had a responsibility to maintain the
confidentiality of confidential records obtained as part of this
process.
REPRESENTATIVE ALLARD asked who would be responsible for
enforcement and ensuring that this wouldn't happen to someone
else.
SENATOR CLAMAN replied that the responsibility would fall on the
prosecutor to make sure that civil charges were initiated for
people with a history of violent crimes that were found
incompetent to proceed.
4:58:00 PM
MS. POTTER, in response to Representative Allard, noted that
Section 4 outlined the criminal code and the duties of the
prosecutor while Section 6 listed the civil code and the
evaluation procedure for civil commitment.
4:58:50 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRAY asked whether, at the end of the 24-month
commitment period, the commitment would be continually renewed.
SENATOR CLAMAN replied that nothing prevented the department
from filing another civil commitment petition at the 24-month
mark.
REPRESENTATIVE GRAY asked where people on the 4-month waitlist
for API went during the wait period.
SENATOR CLAMAN clarified that the 4-month waitlist was for
restoration beds, not to be confused with involuntary commitment
beds. He explained that it depends on whether the individual
was out on bail or in jail. He expounded on provisions in
Section 3 and Section 4 of the bill, which expanded the capacity
of the evaluation and restoration process in an outpatient
setting.
REPRESENTATIVE GRAY sought to verify that Alaska had numerous
facilities to accommodate those individuals on 24-month
commitment.
5:01:07 PM
SENATOR CLAMAN noted that API, through the Department of Family
and Community Services (DFCS), did not submit a fiscal note
indicating that no additional cost would be associated with
longer periods of commitment.
5:03:14 PM
CHAIR VANCE announced that CSSB 53(FIN) AM would be held over.
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|---|---|
| SB 53 Sponsor Statement version T.A.pdf |
HJUD 5/10/2023 1:00:00 PM |
SB 53 |
| SB 53 version T.A.PDF |
HJUD 5/10/2023 1:00:00 PM |
SB 53 |
| SB 53 Sectional Analysis version T.A.pdf |
HJUD 5/10/2023 1:00:00 PM |
SB 53 |
| SB 53 Research - CSG Competency Report 10.1.2020.pdf |
HJUD 5/10/2023 1:00:00 PM |
SB 53 |
| SB 53 Research - NCSL Competency to Stand Trial General Overview 11.1.2022.pdf |
HJUD 5/10/2023 1:00:00 PM |
SB 53 |
| SB 53 Research - Forensic Psychiatric Hospital Feasibility Study Draft 2.1.2019.pdf |
HJUD 5/10/2023 1:00:00 PM |
SB 53 |
| SB 53 Research - NCSL Involuntary Commitment Timeline Maximums 3.13.2023.pdf |
HJUD 5/10/2023 1:00:00 PM |
SB 53 |
| SB 53 Research - NCSL Spreadsheet State Involuntary Commitment 3.13.2023.pdf |
HJUD 5/10/2023 1:00:00 PM |
SB 53 |
| SB 53 Research KTUU Article 2.15.2022.pdf |
HJUD 5/10/2023 1:00:00 PM |
SB 53 |
| SB 53 Supporting Document - Frequently Asked Questions 5.5.2023.pdf |
HJUD 5/10/2023 1:00:00 PM |
SB 53 |
| SB 53 Testimony Received 5.4.2023.pdf |
HJUD 5/10/2023 1:00:00 PM |
SB 53 |
| SB 53 Fiscal Note #3 DOA-LAS-PDA (03-10-23).pdf |
HJUD 5/10/2023 1:00:00 PM |
SB 53 |
| SB 53 Fiscal Note #5 DOA-LAS-OPA (04-07-23).pdf |
HJUD 5/10/2023 1:00:00 PM |
SB 53 |
| SB 53 Fiscal Note #7 DFCS-IMH-API (05-08-23).pdf |
HJUD 5/10/2023 1:00:00 PM |
SB 53 |
| SB 53 Fiscal Note #8 DOL-CD-CJL (05-08-23).pdf |
HJUD 5/10/2023 1:00:00 PM |
SB 53 |
| SB 53 Fiscal Note #9 JUD-ACS-TC (05-08-23).pdf |
HJUD 5/10/2023 1:00:00 PM |
SB 53 |
| HB 4 - Sponsor Statement.pdf |
HJUD 5/10/2023 1:00:00 PM HJUD 5/12/2023 1:00:00 PM |
HB 4 |
| HB 4 - v.A.PDF |
HFSH 5/11/2023 1:00:00 PM HFSH 5/12/2023 1:00:00 PM HJUD 5/10/2023 1:00:00 PM HJUD 5/11/2023 1:00:00 PM |
HB 4 |
| HB 4 - Sectional Analysis.pdf |
HFSH 5/11/2023 1:00:00 PM HFSH 5/12/2023 1:00:00 PM HJUD 5/10/2023 1:00:00 PM HJUD 5/11/2023 1:00:00 PM |
HB 4 |
| HB 4 - AK Chamber Dittman Poll Page.pdf |
HFSH 5/11/2023 1:00:00 PM HFSH 5/12/2023 1:00:00 PM HJUD 5/10/2023 1:00:00 PM |
HB 4 |
| HB 4 - Maine Policy Institute Study on RCV.pdf |
HFSH 5/11/2023 1:00:00 PM HFSH 5/12/2023 1:00:00 PM HJUD 5/10/2023 1:00:00 PM |
HB 4 |
| HB 4 - Fiscal Note GOV-ELEC.pdf |
HFSH 5/12/2023 1:00:00 PM HJUD 5/10/2023 1:00:00 PM |
HB 4 |